We seek to identify the causal eect of sentiment innovations on consumption. Using unique Australian consumer sentiment survey data we show that, immediately after elections with a change of government, consumers self-identifying as supporters of the winning party report substantially more optimistic beliefs about expected economic conditions than supporters of the losing party. We argue that this variation in beliefs is orthogonal to changes in current fundamentals. We nd robust evidence that these shifts in beliefs have a causal eect on spending intentions. Using geographic variation in vote-shares and automobile purchases we also nd evidence of an eect on actual spending.
Introduction
Changes in expectations about future economic conditions are thought by many to be an important source of variation in consumer spending. Innovations to consumer sentiment indices may reveal revisions in beliefs about future economic conditions and in turn have a causal eect on consumption. Among economic commentators and political and business leaders it is widely accepted that consumer sentiment measures are both prognostic and causal. Some policymakers have also expressed support for this view (Yellen 2015; Stevens 2011 ), while Hall (1993 and Blanchard (1993) have argued that an autonomous drop in consumption foreshadowed in consumer sentiment was an important contributor to the 1990-91 recession in the United States. Consistent with these views, there is a sizable correlation between consumption growth and consumer sentiment (Figure 1 ). However, many academic economists remain skeptical about the information contained in consumer sentiment indices. The correlation between sentiment and consumption growth could reect a common factor, such as changes in current income, that independently inuences both sentiment and consumption, rather than sentiment having any causal eect on consumption.
Typical of this view, Milton Friedman (1992) argued that They [consumer condence indices] are mostly a reection of what's going on rather than a cause.
In general, it is dicult to identify whether innovations to consumer sentiment have a causal eect on consumption because it is challenging to nd variation in sentiment that is orthogonal to variation in current economic fundamentals. However, in this paper, we are able to consider cross-sectional variation in sentiment related to individuals' political partisanship to isolate variation in sentiment that is plausibly orthogonal to changes in current economic fundamentals. We use individual response data from the Australian consumer sentiment survey because it is unique in asking individuals' about their voting intentions. We document that consumers report substantially higher levels of sentiment when their self-identied political party holds oce at a federal level compared to those who support the opposition party. This can be seen in Figure 2 , which shows the consumer sentiment index separately for supporters of the two major political parties in Australia: the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Liberal/National Party. Over the period for which we have aggregate-level consumer sentiment data, there were four federal elections which resulted in a change of government: 1983, 1996, 2007 and 2013 . These elections are represented by vertical lines in the gure. Strikingly, the dierence in sentiment between these two groups of voters is large, the relative change in sentiment occurs precisely at elections, and is sustained for the entire period each political party holds oce.
The sharp and discrete change in sentiment at changes of government which in our sample have not coincided with major economic events indicates that the variation in sentiment we exploit is unlikely to be related to changes in current or past fundamental drivers of consumption. Furthermore, the timing of the shifts in sentiment at changes of government indicates that the variation reects partisanship aecting economic beliefs rather than perceptions of current economic conditions aecting partisanship. Thus, we believe these shifts in sentiment around changes of government reect revisions in beliefs about future economic conditions. The consumer sentiment index is an average of sub-indexes surveying consumers on their beliefs about prospective changes in both personal and general economic conditions. The most pronounced revision in beliefs at changes of government is to beliefs about general economic conditions, suggesting that expectations about changes in tax and transfer policy following a change in government are not an important source of the dierence in sentiment between ALP and Liberal/National voters. Supporting this, we show using individual response data that controlling for observed dierences between ALP and Liberal/National party supporters has a negligible eect on the dierence between the two groups in beliefs about personal and general economic conditions.
Our identication approach diers from much of the existing literature on consumer sentiment, which has mostly considered time series data and a control variable approach in seeking to identify whether innovations to sentiment have a causal eect on consumption. Carroll et al. (1994) and Ludvigson (2004) nd that after controlling for economic fundamentals measured by labor income growth, stock prices and short-term interest rates that sentiment contains some small but statistically signicant independent information about future consumption growth. But it is unclear what additional information is contained in consumer sentiment. The incremental predictive power of sentiment could reect current or past events embedded in other fundamentals that have not been controlled for, rather than any independent causal eect of sentiment innovations on spending (Ludvigson 2004) . We believe our identication approach has two important advantages relative to this approach: rst, by using cross-sectional data we remove all aggregate economic shocks that aect both sentiment and consumption, and; second, by using variation in sentiment caused by changes in government, rather than the residual-based approach of the time-series literature, we can be more condent that the variation we use is orthogonal to changes in current economic fundamentals.
We use two measures of consumer spending to estimate whether the shift in sentiment between ALP and Liberal/National voters at changes of government has a causal eect on consumption. The primary measure we use is self-reported spending intentions for a major household item, which is asked as part of the consumer sentiment survey, allowing us to match reported sentiment, partisanship and spending intentions at the individual level. Our second measure of spending exploits geographic variation in vote shares across postcodes (equivalent to a ZIP code in the U.S.) and new automobile sales to households as a postcode-level consumption proxy. Auto sales is well-suited for our purposes, being an important spending decision for most households.
Using the self-reported spending intentions data, we show that consumers report signicantly more positive spending intentions when the political party they support is in government. The shift in spending intentions coincides with each of the three changes of government for which individual response data from the consumer sentiment survey are available : 1996, 2007 and 2013 . To estimate the whether changes in sentiment have a casual eect on spending intentions, we focus on the period around each change of government and at the individual level regress reported spending intentions on reported sentiment, using self-identied partisanship as an instrument for sentiment. This approach uses only variation in beliefs correlated with political partisanship to identify the eect of sentiment on spending intentions, which we argue is variation orthogonal to changes in current economic fundamentals. We nd robust evidence that an increase in sentiment causes consumers to report signicantly more positive spending intentions. Our cross-sectional approach implicitly controls for economy-wide shocks. But partisanship is correlated with economic variables, and it is possible that economic shocks to specic occupations or to parts of the income distribution independently inuence consumption. To control for this, we regress postcode-level vote shares on a large set of economic variables and use only the variation in postcode-level vote shares that cannot be explained by economic controls as our source of cross-sectional variation. The results are qualitatively similar.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our paper provides evidence that consumer sentiment has a causal eect on consumption. The sharp change in sentiment between ALP and Liberal/National voters at elections, which is unlikely to be related to a change in current fundamentals, precedes changes in spending intentions for the two groups. The earlier literature has largely been unable to identify whether the information contained in consumer sentiment mostly proxies current and past fundamentals contained in other macroeconomic series, or contains independent information about future consumption plans. Second, our results provide a basis for believing that changes in pure sentiment can affect consumption. Disagreement between ALP and Liberal/National voters is evident in expectations for both personal and general economic conditions, which cannot be mutually consistent, implying that, from the point of view of an outside observer, the variation in sentiment we exploit is more likely to be noise than news about fundamentals.
1 Reinforcing this, the political science literature has documented that dierences in political aliations can aect how individuals perceive even past economic events (Bartels 2002) . Thus, our results suggest an expansive view of sentiment, providing empirical support for recent theoretical models that highlight a role for non-fundamental drivers of consumption (e.g., Lorenzoni 2009a, and Angeletos and La'O 2013) . Third, by exploiting geographic variation in consumer sentiment and new automobile purchases, we are able to assess whether self-reported spending intentions correlate with actual behavior. Our results provide support for the usefulness of spending intentions elicited from surveys, and more generally speaks to the literature on the generalizability of opinions elicited in survey and experimental settings (e.g., Levitt and List 2007).
Our paper is most similar to contemporaneous work by Mian et al. (2015) , who use 1 Barsky and Sims (2012) have argued that consumer condence is likely to reect information about future productivity rather than animal spirits. We do not believe that our results are inconsistent with theirs.
They argue that changes in animal spirits cannot lead to long lived changes in consumption because animal spirits do not aect an economy's productive capacity. Here we have two groups of consumers, so autonomous movements in consumption need not aect the productive capacity of the economy, if the consumption of one group of consumers osets the other.
United States data to show that consumers report more positive views about government economic policy when the political party they support controls the Presidency. However, they nd only suggestive evidence that dierences between Democrats and Republicans in views on the success of government policy aects spending intentions and no evidence of a relationship between views about government economic policy and county-level automobile spending. The Australian setting provides three key advantages compared to the United States. Firstly, because the Australian consumer sentiment survey includes a question on voting intentions, we can directly observe political aliation, rather than needing to impute it based on proxies for partisanship; this enables us to precisely estimate the eect of sentiment on spending intentions. Secondly, we use new automobile sales to households as our spending variable, whereas Mian et al. (2015) use registration data, that also includes sales to business and the government, which adds noise to their measure of observed spending. Thirdly, while voting is voluntary in the United States it is compulsory in Australia, reducing the possibility that local-area partisanship is mis-measured. However, the Australian survey is unique in asking respondents who they would vote for at a federal election. To measure sentiment, each month respondents are asked about:
(i) their current personal nancial situation compared to a year ago;
(ii) the expected change in their personal nancial situation over the year ahead; (iii) the expected change in economic conditions over the year ahead; and (iv) the expected change in economic conditions over the next ve years; Individual responses for each question are classied as either positive, unchanged / don't know, or negative. An index for each question is constructed by subtracting the proportion of negative responses from the proportion of positive responses, and then adding 100. A value of 100 indicates a neutral economic outlook, with the fraction of negative responses equal to the fraction of positive responses. Each question asks about the change rather than the level of economic conditions, and so is a stationary variable; each index has averaged close to 100 since the inception of the survey. The survey is nationally representative and has sample size of about 1,200 each month (compared to 500 for the Michigan Survey of Consumers).
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For each of the four questions outlined above, we construct an index separately for ALP and Liberal/National party voters, and the dierence (ALP minus Liberal/National party voter sentiment) is shown in Figure 3 . For each question, consumers report more positive responses when the political party they would vote for holds oce federally. Notably the relative change in sentiment occurs in the month of an election at which there is a change of government. This change in sentiment in an election month is sharp.
3 These large movements in sentiment in the month of a change in government support using partisanship as a way to identify the eect of the sentiment on consumption. We nd it hard to think of any changes in current or past consumption fundamentals that could consistently move sentiment by this much in the month of a change of government. We show later that dierences in sentiment between these two groups of voters remain even after controlling for dierences in the economic and demographic characteristics of voters.
Consumers become more optimistic about both personal and national economic conditions when the political party they support wins oce (Figure3). Conversely opposition party supporters become more pessimistic about both personal and economic conditions. The largest revision in beliefs in the month of a change of government comes from beliefs about future economic conditions in one and ve years time. While there is a 2.5 standard 2 The aggregate consumer sentiment index is constructed by averaging responses to these four questions as well as responses to a questions asking about whether it is a good time to purchase a major household item.
We view this latter question as representing an outcome variable as it measures spending intentions. We discuss the spending intentions question in more detail in Section 4.1.
3 Unlike in the US, the government changes hands as soon as the election result is known. deviation movement on average for the series relating to personal nances in the month of a change of government, the series relating to future economic conditions moves on average by 4.5 standard deviations. Importantly for our purposes, this indicates that government and opposition party supporters disagree in their expectations about both the state of the macroeconomy and their own personal nances. This suggests that the variation in sentiment we use is not primarily being driven by beliefs about how the incoming government will change the income distribution through tax and transfer policies. Rather, there is disagreement about how the government will manage the overall macroeconomy.
As an aside, an entirely separate survey provides corroborating evidence that partisanship aects economic beliefs. A semi-annual Newspoll survey published in The Australian newspaper asks a randomly selected sample of voters whether they expect their standard of living to improve, stay the same, or get worse over the next six months. Figure 5 shows indexes for ALP and Liberal/National party voters, constructed using the same methodology as the consumer sentiment survey. Respondents are substantially more optimistic about their standard of living when the political party they support holds oce federally.
As noted, the relative change in beliefs between ALP and Liberal/National party voters in both the consumer sentiment and the Newspoll survey is sharp and occurs precisely when the government changes hands. This is despite the fact that political opinion polling data predicted the changes of governments we observe in our sample well in advance of the election ( Figure 6 ). 
Conditional consumer sentiment indices
The large movements in consumer sentiment following an election with a change of government indicates that the variation in sentiment we will exploit is unlikely to be related to past or current economic fundamentals. This is further supported by the political science literature which nds that partisanship aects an individual's outlook for the the economy.
Here we address the concern that the movement in sentiment observed following a change of government reects changes to tax and transfer policies made by the incoming government that dierentially aect government and opposition party supporters. That is, the government may be expected to enact policies that favor its supporters. Given that policy set by the federal government cannot be targeted to specic individuals, but rather to groups of people (based on for example, their income, age or occupation) we control for observed economic and demographic dierences between ALP and Liberal/National party voters. In particular, using information collected from respondents in the consumer sentiment survey, we construct sentiment indexes for ALP and Liberal/National party voters that condition on individual-level economic and demographic characteristics.
We assume that the categorical responses to the consumer sentiment questions (positive, unchanged / don't know, or negative) mask a smooth underlying distribution of consumer sentiment. For each sentiment question, and each survey month, we t an ordered probit model:
where s * i,j,t is the latent sentiment of consumer i in response to question j in survey month t, ALP i is a dummy variable if consumer i identies as an ALP voter, φ j,t is the coecient on the ALP dummy variable, and ε i,j,t is a normally distributed error term.
5 X i,t is a vector of covariates for person i, which is discussed in more detail below. Γ j,t is the vector of coecients on those covariates in month t. Negative responses are assumed to correspond to levels of the latent sentiment variable below the threshold µ low j,t , positive responses correspond to levels of the latent sentiment variable above the threshold µ high j,t , and unchanged/don't know responses to levels of the latent sentiment variable between these two thresholds. Thus, the probability that consumer i reports a positive response to question j in survey month t is
and analogously for the other two responses. The thresholds µ low j,,t and µ high j,t and the coecients φ j,t and Γ j,t are jointly estimated using maximum likelihood, under the identication constraints that the error term, ε i,j,t , has unit variance and the regression omits a constant term. Observations are weighted by their sampling frequency, ω i .
We are interested in the eect of partisanship on consumer attitudes. The estimated average dierence in the probability of reporting a positive response to question j in month t between an otherwise similar ALP voter and a Liberal/National party voter is
and similarly for negative responses,
Subtracting Equation (4) from Equation (3), and rearranging gives:
The rst term on the right-hand side of Equation (5) is the probability for an ALP voter of reporting a positive response less the probability of reporting a negative response; the second term is the same for Liberal/National party voters. Each term mirrors the published sentiment indices, which are constructed by subtracting the fraction of negative responses from positive responses. Thus, estimates of Equation (5) provide conditional analogues to the raw sentiment indices.
The covariates used in Equation (1) are an individual's age, income, gender, occupa-tion, education, home ownership status and whether they live in a metropolitan or nonmetropolitan area. The consumer sentiment survey categorizes income to be within a $10,000 bucket starting from $20,000 up to $100,000. All incomes above $100,000 are placed into one category and all incomes less than or equal to $20,000 are placed into another category.
Income dummy variables, in these ranges, are included in Equation (1). This allows for the eect of income on sentiment to dier non-linearly by income category.
The conditional estimates for each expectations question in the sentiment survey are shown in Figure 4 and are similar to the unconditional estimates, shown in Figure 3 . Notably, the sharp relative movement in sentiment following an election with a change of government remains even after for controlling for demographic dierences between ALP and Liberal/National party voters. Supporters of each party continue to disagree on both expectations of their own personal economic conditions and future macroeconomic conditions.
This provides evidence that shifts in sentiment are unlikely to be driven by expected changes in tax or transfer policy, which are likely to be related to observable dierences between voters.
Data
We study the eect of consumer sentiment on consumption using individual-and postcodelevel consumption data. On an individual level, we match reported spending intentions to reported economic beliefs. We follow a growing literature in using spending intentions from survey data to understand consumption behaviour (see for example Bachmann et al. (2015) for the eect of ination expectations on spending and Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) for the eect of the 2003 US tax rebate). Our study is novel in providing corroborating evidence using actual spending data at a postcode level, the most disaggregated level at which a consumption proxy is available. We measure consumption using the number of new automobile purchases in a postcode and match this to postcode-level data on partisanship.
Individual level data
We proxy consumption on an individual level using spending intentions data from the consumer sentiment survey. In particular, we use the response to the question on whether it is a good time to purchase a major household item. 
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We measure partisanship on a postcode level as the fraction of votes going to the ALP in a federal election using the Australian Electoral Commission's two-party preferred measure. tralia, with electorate boundaries set by an independent non-partisan commission. Voting occurs at more than 8,000 polling places. We aggregate these polling place results to the 2,738 postcodes in Australia.
Consumption
We use the number of new automobile purchases as our postcode-level consumption measure.
We think that automobile purchases are a good proxy for consumption because they repre- To control for dierences in population growth across postcodes we measure new automobile sales in per capita terms. Population data is sourced from the ve-yearly Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas Census. We linearly interpolate the data to get population estimates between Census dates.
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8 Sales to businesses and governments account for around 55 per cent of total annual new automobile sales.
Control variables
The federal government's tax and transfer policies could dierentially aect dierent groups of voters. We use a range of postcode-level variables to control for these dierences. We obtain average taxable income data, from the Australian Taxation Oce. The Census provides a range of postcode-level economic variables every ve years: the share of people with a college education, average age, the unemployment rate, the share of people who rent, and the share of employed people in white-collar professions. We also collect postcode-level information on the share of employment by industry. Industries are grouped according to the NAICS classication. Information is also collected on the geographic location of a postcode.
Postcodes are classied -in increasing order of remoteness -as being in either a major city, inner regional, outer regional, remote or very remote. These data are sourced from the Australian Statistical Geography Standard. Throughout the paper, we exclude postcodes in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), where the federal public service is located. Changes of government may have an immediate eect on the incomes of federal public servants, through hiring or redundancies. Hence, consumption for those people can be aected by other channels rather than via sentiment eects.
Summary statistics
The top and bottom panels of Table 1 and Liberal/National party voters. Consumers report higher spending intentions when their political party holds government at the federal level, with statistical tests nding a break in the mean level of the series following an election that results in a change in government (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix for Bai and Perron (1998) multiple break test results).
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This nding also carries through when we construct conditional spending intentions indices for ALP and Liberal/National party voters using the methodology outlined in Section 2.3. In particular, panel (b) of Figure 8 shows that dierences in spending intentions between ALP and Liberal/National party voters remain after controlling for an individual's economic and demographic characteristics. A Bai and Perron (1998) multiple break point test run on the conditional spending intentions index conrms a break in the index at each change of 11 The 1996 election was held on 2 March. The consumer sentiment survey is conducted at the end of each month and can continue into the start of the following month. This is why the break in the spending intentions series for the 1996 election occurs in February 1996.
government (Table A1 in To formally test if higher sentiment causes higher spending intentions, we estimate the following regression on the individual response consumer sentiment survey data:
where spend i,t is the reported spending intention of individual i in month t and expect i,t
is an individual's reported expectations of future economic conditions, X ji,t is the full set of economic and demographic control variables for person i listed in Section 2.3 and δ t is a survey month dummy. We measure expect i,t using either of two questions in the consumer sentiment survey asking individuals about their expectations of macroeconomic conditions over the next one and ve years. These questions capture an individual's beliefs about macroeconomic conditions faced by all consumers, and so abstract from beliefs about how government policy aects the distribution of income.
The diculty in estimating Equation (6) is that while expect i,t captures sentiment shocks, it also captures shocks to fundamental factors that could jointly inuence consumption and macroeconomic expectations. We therefore need an instrument that is correlated with sentiment but not the fundamental macroeconomic shock. Our instrument is an individual's partisanship. Specically, we instrument expect i,t with a dummy variable that is equal to one if a survey respondent's voting intention matches the political party in oce and is zero otherwise. We believe that political preferences are a valid instrument given that it is dicult to think of any fundamental factor that could consistently shift expectations of future macroeconomic conditions for both ALP and Liberal/National party voters this sharply in the month of a change of government.
Our identication assumption is strongest in the period around which there has been a change in government. Hence, we estimate Equation (6), with expect i,t instrumented with partisanship, over the period one year before and after an election with a change in government. Note that Equation (6) 12 Although the relationship between sentiment and spending intentions may not be linear as assumed in the second stage regression here, we are simply interested in identifying whether a casual channel from sentiment to spending intentions exist, and so we use a linear probability model for simplicity.
Results from three elections -1996, 2007 and 2013 -are shown in We also grouped responses to the spending intentions questions into two categories (one category for positive spending intentions and another category for unchanged and negative spending intentions) and estimated the second stage using a probit model and the rst stage as a linear probability model. The results were similar to those reported in the text.
level.
Consumption data
We have shown that an improvement in expected future macroeconomic conditions has a causal eect on spending intentions. Here we look to see if automobile consumption data support the results from the spending intentions data.
Without controls
We log (mv it ) = α i +
where mv it is per capita new automobile sales in postcode i in quarter t, α i is a postcodespecic xed eect, d t is an indicator variable taking the value unity in year-quarter t and zero otherwise, ALP τ i is the ALP vote share in postcode i for an election held at time τ , and it is an error term.
13 The coecients δ j are quarterly xed eects, capturing all variation 13 The use of a log transformation for the dependent variable results in the exclusion of observations with zero automobile sales in a given quarter. Based on the regression weights, which are equal to the average number of automobile sales over the two years prior to a change of government, the postcodes that contain a zero observation in any given quarter account for less than 1.5 percent of new automobile sales over the weighting period. As an alternative, we have estimated Equation (7) 
With controls
An incoming government could enact tax and transfer policies that favors its supporters.
This could have a direct eect on consumption by changing the distribution of income, implying that government policy, rather than sentiment, could be responsible for changes in automobile consumption. Policy set by the federal government cannot be targeted to specic individuals, but rather to particular groups of people based on observable characteristics. Table 1 shows that partisanship is correlated with a range of economic indicators. While our identication approach uses partisanship as a source of variation in economic perceptions, there would ideally also be no dierence in how government policy aects ALP and Liberal/National party voters. Here we employ three approaches to control for dierences between ALP and Liberal/National party voters. In the rst approach, we construct a measure of pure partisanship by isolating variation in the ALP vote share at each election that is uncorrelated with observable economic dierences between ALP and Liberal/National party voters. We then use this variation as our source of identication. The second approach allows for time-varying economic shocks correlated with the level of income. The third approach employs dierence-in-dierence regressions, allowing for dierences in income growth across postcodes.
Pure partisanship
To construct a measure of pure partisanship, we separately regress the ALP vote share at the 2007 and 2013 elections on a wide range of economic variables, and take the residual series. The regression includes the full set of demographic and industry variables reported in Table 1 , as well as controls for the geographic characteristics of a postcode. Table A2 in the Online Appendix). The control variables absorb between 55 and 60 per cent of the postcode-level variation in vote shares.
(Regression results are reported in
We then re-estimate Equation (7) replacing the observed ALP vote share variable with our measure of pure partisanship:
where ξ τ i is the residual for postcode i from a regression of the ALP vote for the election held at date τ on the set of control variables described above. To allow for the use of a generated regressor, standard errors are constructed using 1000 bootstrap replications, with resampling conducted at the electorate level.
Results using this residual variation in the ALP vote share for both the 2007 and 2013 elections show a qualitatively similar prole to that from Equation ( Because the control variables absorb over half the variation in the ALP vote share across postcodes, the standard errors around our estimates are now larger. But we nonetheless believe that the point estimates are informative, particularly given that they follow a broadly similar pattern to the point estimates from the regression without controls. These results provide further evidence that consumers' stated spending intentions in the sentiment survey correlate with observed behaviour.
Time-varying shocks correlated with income
To control for time-varying shocks to dierent parts of the income distribution we group postcodes into population-weighted terciles based on the average taxable income in each postcode in the year prior to the 2007 and 2013 elections. A tercile dummy variable interacted with year-quarter dummy variables is then added to Equation (7). Specically, we estimate:
where T ER ik is a dummy variable that is equal to one if postcode i is in tercile k ∈ {1, 2}, where the top income tercile is the omitted category. This exible specication controls for time-varying shocks to each income tercile and allows us to be agnostic as to the source of the shock.
Results for Equation (9) are shown in Figure 11 . The estimated β-coecients are similar to those from Equation (7) without controls, suggesting that our earlier results were not primarily driven by shocks to dierent parts of the income distribution (compare Figure 9 with Figure 11 ). Again, even after controlling for shocks to each tercile, we nd that the pattern of the estimated β-coecients lines up well with the dierence in spending intentions between ALP and Liberal/National Party voters in the consumer sentiment survey.
Dierence-in-dierence regressions
To this point, we have relied upon point-in-time data, mostly from the 2006 and 2011
Census. This approach controls for dierential income shocks correlated with observable economic characteristics. We now adopt a dierence-in-dierence framework, which allows us to control for changes in postcode-level incomes over time. Here we argue that if dierent groups of voters experience dierent shocks then this should be reected in their incomes.
We estimate the following dierence-in-dierence regression at an annual frequency: Because our identication strategy relies on variation in the ALP vote share across postcodes, we would expect the eect of partisanship on automobile sales to be more pronounced in the postcodes that have either a high fraction of ALP or Liberal/National voters. We would like to see if just using these extreme postcodes makes a material dierence to our results. The bottom panels of Figure 12 report estimates for Equation (10) Secondly, we make use of an extensive set of controls to account for the fact that partisanship is correlated with economic variables. These controls allow us to the separate out the eect of economic policies targeted to specic demographic groups from their perceived fundamentals. After controlling for economic and demographic characteristics, we still nd a positive relationship between sentiment and our measures of consumption. We believe that this provides support for the notion that sentiment indices contain meaningful independent information about future consumption, as argued by Hall (1993) and Blanchard (1993) .
Our paper is most similar to Gerber and Huber (2009) This leads to the question of why we nd that changes in sentiment aect consumption while Mian et al. (2015) do not. We believe that our data allows us to better measure sentiment, partisanship and consumption at a disaggregated level. In an online appendix we provide a reconciliation between our results and those from Mian et al. (2015) . To summarize, Mian et al. (2015) have to impute an individual's partisanship based on the county where they live. Imputing partisanship in our data based on an individual's postcode, rather than using their stated voting intention, results in no longer being able to see the eect of an election on consumer's self-reported spending intentions. Secondly, Mian et al. (2015) measure automobile sales using registration data which includes sales to businesses and governments as well as households. Using our data, we nd that the inclusion of business and government automobile sales makes it more dicult to see a positive relationship between the ALP vote share and automobile sales. Lastly, since voting is compulsory in Australia,
we have a better measure of local area partisanship.
6 Implications for macroeconomic models
To this point we have taken the innovations to consumer sentiment at elections as given, and sought to identify the eect of these innovations on individual consumer's spending intentions and postcode-level new automobile purchases. Here we discuss whether this variation could reect mechanisms identied by existing macro models.
The sharp changes in sentiment at changes of government represents variation plausibly unrelated to changes in current economic conditions, suggesting that changes of government may act as news shocks (Beaudry and Portier 2006) . Barsky and Sims (2012, p. 1371) have argued that fundamental news is the main driving force behind the observed relationship between condence and subsequent economic activity.
We are skeptical about the news contained in sentiment innovations at changes of government. Changes of government could lead to systematic changes in the income distribution, beneting supporters at the expense of opponents, but consumers disagree on both expectations of personal and general economic conditions. Supporters of the winning party expect both their own and national economic conditions to substantially improve, while supporters of the losing party expect the opposite. Any news-based explanation would have to reconcile these conicting beliefs about national economic conditions. We also nd it dicult to think of systematic changes in government economic policy that could cause the magnitude of revisions to beliefs about personal economic conditions that we see in the sentiment survey at changes of government. Furthermore, controlling for a wide range of economic and demographic groupings to which economic policy could be targeted does little to reduce the dierence in sentiment between supporters and opponents of the government.
Another possibility is that the variation in sentiment we use represents noise shocks, which Barsky and Sims (2012, p. 1345) is justied by signals that others are also optimistic (pessimistic). The variation in sentiment at elections that we document could be a result of higher-order belief dynamics along the lines of Angeletos and La'O (2013) , but this is necessarily speculative because only rst-order beliefs are observable. Furthermore, there is nothing in the theory proposed by Angeletos and La'O (2013) that would generate strong positive within-group correlation in beliefs and strong negative between-group correlation in beliefs, as we document by partisanship.
Considering these possibilities, we view the partisan variation in sentiment to most likely represent noise. But we remain surprised that barriers to learning are suciently strong for these dierence in beliefs to be so persistent and predictable. While dicult to rationalize from a theoretical point of view, it is these features of the sentiment data that are so useful from an econometric identication point of view.
Conclusion
We use novel variation in consumer sentiment associated with political preferences to investigate whether innovations to consumer sentiment have a causal eect on consumption.
Consumers are substantially more optimistic about economic conditions when the party they support is in government. The dierence in sentiment between supporters of the two parties is large and the relative change occurs immediately following an election at which there is a change of government.
To see if the beliefs captured in sentiment surveys aect consumption, we match individual consumers' expectations of future economic conditions from the consumer sentiment survey to their spending intentions. We nd that consumers who have a more positive economic outlook report more positive spending intentions. We validate these results using postcode level automobile consumption data. In particular, following an election with a change of government, automobile purchases increase by relatively more in postcodes with a greater share of voters for the winning party.
We believe that our results have important implications. Firstly, our results indicate that consumer sentiment has a casual eect on spending intentions. Given our extensive use of controls, and the large movement in sentiment we observe at elections, we believe that the variation in sentiment we identify represents pure sentiment shocks rather than unbiased expectations about changes in future incomes. This suggests that consumer sentiment can contain important information not captured by other macroeconomic indicators. From a policy makers perspective, divergences between consumer sentiment and the level of economic activity implied by macroeconomic data may contain important information about future consumption. Secondly, we have found that spending intentions elicited in sentiment surveys correlate well with actual consumption. Since individual level consumption data is dicult to obtain, our results provide support for researchers using spending intentions to study consumption behavior. Our paper is most closely related to Mian et al. (2015) , who use U.S. data to investigate whether changes in county-level consumption following a presidential election, that results in a change in party that holds the presidency, are related to county-level voting outcomes.
While we nd that an increase in sentiment leads to higher consumer spending, they nd no statistically signicant relationship between sentiment regarding government economic policy and consumer spending. We oer a few explanations as to why our results dier to theirs. paper, where we observe partisanship, we can see that imputing partisanship introduces noise into the data. Nonetheless, these estimates do suggest that ALP voters became more pessimistic about the national economy (sub-indices d and e in Figure A1 ) following changes in government. But the eect of partisanship on spending intentions is too small to detect when voting intention is imputed from postcode-level vote shares. These results using the imputed measure of partisanship mirror the ndings of Mian et al. (2015) for the US, and so provide a reconciliation between our ndings.
In terms of how automobiles are measured, because we are interested in the eect of con-sumer sentiment on household consumption, we use automobile sales to households. Mian et al. (2015) use registration data which includes automobile sales to businesses and governments in addition to households. To see the eect of using total automobile sales data we re-estimate Equation (7) from our paper using Australian automobile registration data. The data are sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics and are available on an annual basis.
17 Figure A2 shows the eect of an increase in the ALP vote share on automobile sales. It now becomes unclear whether changes in sentiment aect consumption, with the estimated coecients having a saw-toothed pattern around the 2007 election.
18
Finally, voting in Australia is compulsory. In contrast, voting in the US is voluntary.
This can lead to selection issues. For example, it is well known that voter turnout can be aected by opinion polls. This leads to measurement error which can downwardly bias the estimated eect of partisanship on consumption.
17 The VFACTs data used in the main body of the paper contain only sales of automobiles to households. Here we use annual data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics because it contains automobiles purchased by households, businesses and the government.
18 Mian et al. (2015) also use credit card data in their analysis. Unfortunately we do not have access to credit card data. The sequential test selects the number of breaks stepwise from zero breaks using the SupF test assuming a 5 percent signicance level. The break dates are those identied by minimizing the sum of squared errors conditional on the number of breaks. ***, ** and * represent statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Summary: There is statistically signicant evidence of a break in relative spending intentions for ALP and Liberal/National voters at changes of government. 
Sales to Households Total Registrations
Notes: The graph shows the estimated coecients β j for Equation (7), using annual vehicles data and 2007 vote share data; the coecients β j are relative to the omitted year 2007, when the ALP won government. We measure per capita automobile purchases in two ways: from sales to households and from registration data that includes sales to households, businesses and the government; registration data are available only at an annual frequency.
Summary: Measuring automobile sales using total registrations rather than sales to households adds noise, obscuring the relationship between changes in government and new automobile consumption.
